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The EITC is designed to encourage work. But EITC-induced increases in labor supply
may drive wages down, shifting the intended transfer toward employers and hurting non-
EITC low-skill workers. I exploit variation across family types and skill levels to identify
the e￿ect of a large EITC expansion in the mid 1990s. Ceteris paribus, low-skill single
mothers keep only $0.70 of every dollar they receive. Employers of low-skill labor capture
$0.72, $0.30 from single mothers plus $0.43 from ineligible workers whose after-tax incomes
fall when the EITC is expanded. The net transfer to low-skill workers is less than $0.28
per dollar spent.1 Introduction
Most means-tested income redistribution programs impose high e￿ective tax rates on
earned income, thereby discouraging potential recipients from working. In recent decades,
policy changes in the United States have shifted the incentives toward encouraging work
via the imposition of time limits and work requirements on welfare recipients and via
repeated expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which by 2000 was 70%
larger than traditional welfare (Hotz and Scholz, 2003).
The EITC is often seen as an implementation of a Negative Income Tax, or NIT (Fried-
man, 1962), but its central feature distinguishes it. Where an NIT would be available even
to non-workers, only families with earned income can receive the EITC. Mo￿tt (2003a)
notes that the hybrid system formed by the combination of the EITC and traditional
welfare amounts to a sort of an NIT. However, the two programs are not often seen as
part of a uni￿ed policy, and EITC expansions have not typically been accompanied by
increases in the welfare bene￿t.
An important intended e￿ect of the EITC is to increase labor supply among eligible
workers.1 But the literature on tax incidence (reviewed by Kotliko￿ and Summers 1987
and Fullerton and Metcalf 2002) emphasizes that taxes may in￿uence the equilibrium price
of the good being taxed. In the standard model, EITC-induced labor supply increases lead
to lower wages, allowing employers to capture a portion of the intended transfer. Moreover,
because EITC recipients (primarily single mothers) compete in the same labor markets as
others who are ineligible for the credit, wage declines extend to many workers who do not
receive o￿setting EITC payments. These unintended transfers limit the EITC’s capacity
to redistribute income to the poor.
Endogenizing the wage thus reduces the attractiveness of the EITC. But the practical
importance of incidence e￿ects is unclear. Tax changes are rarely large enough to have
detectable e￿ects on prices, so estimates of the incidence of income taxes have been few
and far between. Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) note that most analyses of the distribution
of tax burdens (e.g., Pechman and Okner, 1974; Pechman, 1985) assume that workers
bear the full weight of income taxes, though they point out that "this assumption has
never been tested" (p. 29).
I use a substantial expansion of the EITC between 1993 and 1995 to estimate the
EITC’s incidence. I focus on the female labor market, and particularly on single women.
1Eissa and Hoynes (2006) review the literature on the EITC’s labor supply e￿ects, while Robins (1985)
summarizes experimental studies of the NIT. Saez (2002b) argues that an EITC-like structure is better
than an NIT when the extensive margin elasticity of labor supply is su￿ciently large. Like other optimal
tax models, Saez’s analysis takes the wage as exogenous.
1Approximately 13% of working women￿all with children, mostly unskilled, and dispropor-
tionately unmarried￿could claim the credit in 1993. Changes in program parameters over
the next two years induced mean absolute changes in marginal and average tax rates for
these women of 9:2% and 8:0%, respectively.2 The resulting labor supply shock provides
variation that can be used to estimate the credit’s incidence.
One contribution of this paper is to extend the traditional partial equilibrium tax
incidence framework to allow for heterogeneity in tax rates. The traditional model treats
labor as an undi￿erentiated input to production and assumes a single tax rate that applies
to all wage income. Neither is accurate: Most taxes di￿erentiate between types of families
and, in e￿ect, between workers of di￿erent skills. Both of these features provide useful
variation. I derive simple expressions relating changes in tax rates to changes in the
quantity and price of types of labor that are distinguished by the skill level and the tax
treatment. Targeted earnings subsidies produce unintended transfers from both targeted
and similarly-skilled ineligible workers to their employers. The transfer to employers is
largest when labor supply is elastic and demand is inelastic; it is paid primarily by targeted
workers only when there are few ineligible workers with skills similar to those of subsidy
recipients.
There are two important empirical hurdles. First, I require measures of the change
in the quantity and price of labor at each skill level. I identify skill levels as points in
the cross-sectional wage distribution. 3 Shifts in the observed wage distribution re￿ect
changes in both the skill composition of labor (i.e. in relative supply) and the wage
earned by workers of each skill. I use a semiparametric "re-weighting" strategy, proposed
by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996, hereafter DFL), to estimate the price component. 4
I also demonstrate that the weights used in this estimator can be interpreted as measures
of the change in labor supply at each skill level.
The supply elasticity is identi￿ed by within-skill comparisons between EITC eligible
and ineligible women. Single mothers’ labor supply increased substantially in the mid-
1990s relative to single women without children. 5 The change is concentrated among
2Each ￿gure is computed over women aged 16-64 in the 1994 March Current Population Survey who
worked at least one week in 1993 and were either the reference person or the wife of the reference person
for their household. The sample and the tax simulation are discussed below.
3I argue below that this is preferable to a simpler strategy that focuses on cells de￿ned based on
observable characteristics (e.g., education), as in Leigh (2007), when the focus is the estimation of labor
demand rather than supply.
4The key assumption is that changes in the skill distribution are fully accounted for by changes in
workers’ observed characteristics. This is common in the inequality literature (see, e.g., Autor et al.,
2005a; Lemieux, 2006). I discuss this assumption at length below, and present evidence (based on wage
changes for groups facing small tax rate shocks and exhibiting small changes in observable selection) that
selection on unobservables is not an important source of bias in my results.
5A small credit for childless families was added during the mid-1990s. I account for this credit in
2women with two or more children and characteristics associated with low earnings, mir-
roring the distribution of changes in the EITC earnings subsidy and associated average
tax rates. The entire change in labor supply occurs through increased participation, with
essentially no change in weekly hours conditional on working. The estimates imply that
the wage elasticity of individual labor supply is about 0.7 on the extensive margin and
zero on the intensive margin, both in close agreement with earlier estimates.
The second hurdle arises in the identi￿cation of the e￿ect of this shock on wages.
Only between-skill comparisons are informative about labor demand. Thus, even when
the reweighting procedure gives accurate estimates of changes in wages at each skill,
the e￿ects of tax changes may be confounded by shifts in the relative demand for high-
and low-skill labor. Indeed, I ￿nd that low-skill workers’ relative wages rose over the
mid-1990s, even as their labor supply increased. A leading explanation is a shift in the
relative demand for low-skill labor, either cyclical or due to changes in the production
technology (i.e., skill-biased technical change, or SBTC). Both factors favored low-skill
workers during the mid-1990s, as the unemployment rate fell steadily during this period
￿ relative employment conditions for low-skill labor are pro-cyclical; see Hoynes (2000) ￿
and research on SBTC indicates that it favored low-skill labor from about 1987 onward
(Autor et al., 2005a).
To reduce bias from demand shifts, I adopt a di￿erence-in-di￿erences strategy, com-
paring the rate of change in skill-level wages across two periods with plausibly similar
demand shifts but di￿erent shocks to labor supply. I use the period from 1988 to 1992
as my counterfactual. Autor et al.’s (2005a) results indicate that the form and rate of
technical change was approximately constant from 1987 through the mid 1990s. I ￿nd
that the relative price of low-skill labor increased even more quickly during the years prior
to the EITC expansion than subsequent to it, indicating an outward shift in the demand
for low-skill labor that masks the e￿ect of the EITC. My preferred speci￿cation allows
for unrestricted trends in the demand for labor at each skill level as well as a skill-biased
"tilting" of these trends over time. I ￿nd that demand is downward sloping but relatively
inelastic, with an elasticity around -0.3. This is precisely the elasticity that Hamermesh
(1993, p. 135) characterizes as a "best guess."
Business cycle trends were sharply di￿erent in my two comparison periods. The na-
tional unemployment rate rose by two percentage points between 1988 and 1992, then fell
by almost exactly the same amount between 1992 and 1996. Thus, identi￿cation of the
demand elasticity based on the comparison between the recessionary 1988-1992 period
my analysis. As discussed below, it was too small to have meaningful impacts on the labor market, and
women without children can be treated as e￿ectively ineligible.
3and the expansionary 1992-1996 period (and a tax-driven expansion of low-skill labor
supply in the latter) likely leads me to understate the decline in low-skilled workers’ rela-
tive wages that occurred as a result of the EITC expansion and to overstate the absolute
demand elasticity.6
I conclude by computing the incidence implied by my estimated elasticities and by
the distribution of EITC-eligible and -ineligible women across skill groups. The results
indicate that the EITC produces extremely large unintended transfers. A dollar of EITC
spending produces transfers of $0.70 to the intended recipients and $0.72 to employers
of low-skill labor, with the excess $0.43 coming from EITC-ineligible workers. Eligible
women’s after-tax incomes, which incorporate changes in earnings from supply shifts as
well as changes in wages, rise by $1.21, while those of ineligible women fall by $0.73.
These precise e￿ects depend on my estimated elasticities, but the qualitative results
do not. Even with quite elastic demand, unintended transfers are substantial relative
to the amount spent on the EITC. Transfers to employers of low-skill labor, and away
from ineligible low-skill workers, are necessary consequences of the EITC’s design. Using
my elasticity estimates, the net transfer to low-skill workers amounts to less than 1/3 of
government outlays, and total after-tax incomes rise by only $0.47 for every dollar spent.
This reduces the attractiveness of the EITC relative to the NIT (which with the same
elasticity parameters produces small transfers from employers to their workers) and to
other income support policies, like traditional welfare, that do not encourage work.
The EITC program is described in Section 2. Section 3 develops the incidence model
with skill and tax rate heterogeneity. Section 4 describes the empirical implementation,
and Section 5 develops a strategy for distinguishing changes in the price and quantity
of labor at each skill level in repeated cross sections. Section 6 describes the data and
presents simple regression estimates of changes in the return to skill surrounding the EITC
expansion. Section 7 presents results, ￿rst describing changes in labor supply and wages,
and then using several speci￿cations to relate these to the underlying elasticity parameters.
Section 8 explores several alternative speci￿cations intended to identify potential biases
in the main estimates. Section 9 presents the incidence calculation.
6The only other period in recent history which matches the mid-1990s on both cyclical and SBTC
dimensions is the late 1990s. There were continued changes in EITC and welfare policy that induced
continuing expansions of low-skill labor supply during this period, however, so the di￿erence-in-di￿erences
in labor supply is approximately zero and the demand elasticity cannot be identi￿ed. I have also explored
estimates that try to di￿erence out business cycle e￿ects by comparing to the expansionary 1983-1986
period. This comparison yields a positive e￿ect of exogenous labor supply expansions on wages; evidently
the bias from changes in SBTC between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s is larger than that from cyclical
di￿erences in my preferred strategy.
42 The EITC Program
The EITC is a refundable tax credit that depends on a family’s total earnings according
to a four-segment schedule.7 Four parameters de￿ne the credit: A phase-in rate 1 < 0,
a maximum credit C, an income level p at which the credit begins to phase out, and a
phase-out rate 2 > 0. If a family’s earned income is y, the credit is:
(1) c =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1y if y   C=1 (phase-in range)
C if C=1 < y  p (plateau)
C   2 (y   p) if p < y  p + C=2 (phase-out)
0 if y > p + C=2 (ineligible):
The parameters vary with the number of children but not with marital status or the
number of workers. Appendix Table 1 presents the program parameters for the years
1983-2001, in 1992 dollars. I focus on the 1993-1996 expansion, in which maximum real
credits (C) grew by 38% for one-child families and by 117% for families with two or more
children but the kink points ( C=1, p, and p+C=2) were essentially stable. A very small
credit was also added for childless families. Figure 1 displays the credit as a function of
real annual earnings and number of children in 1992 and 1996.
Liebman (1998) discusses the labor supply incentives created by the EITC. Increases
in 2 and C both raise virtual income (the zero-hours intercept of the relevant linear
segment of the budget constraint in hours-consumption space). Income and substitution
e￿ects thus reinforce each other in the phase-out range, creating incentives to reduce
labor supply. In the plateau region, the substitution e￿ect is zero but the income e￿ect
is negative. In the phase-in range, however, marginal tax rates (MTRs) are negative and
substitution e￿ects would imply increased labor supply.
This supposes that labor supply decisions are made continuously. Given the concen-
trated distribution of annual hours ￿ 74% of women who work at all in a year work at
least 48 weeks, and 51% work between 38 and 42 hours per week 8 ￿ it seems likely that
the participation decision is often discrete. If so, average tax rates (ATRs) on a woman’s
potential earnings may be more important than MTRs. The EITC produces negative
ATRs for all primary earners with potential earnings below p + C=2, so should have
induced increased participation, at least from single parents.
Estimates of the EITC’s labor supply e￿ects overwhelmingly place them on the ex-
7EITC take-up rates are estimated at 80% or more (Scholz, 1994; Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches, 2007).
8Among single mothers with a high school education or less, a group that is quite likely to be eligible
for the EITC, 64% work full-year and 55% work full time. The source is the 1993 & 1994 March Current
Population Survey; the exact sample is decribed below.
5tensive margin, with labor force participation elasticities with respect to net income be-
tween 0.69 and 1.16 (Eissa and Hoynes, 2006; Hotz and Scholz, 2003). This means that
the EITC unambiguously expands single mothers’ participation (Meyer and Rosenbaum,
2001; Grogger, 2002; Dickert et al., 1995; Keane and Mo￿tt, 1998), though Eissa and
Hoynes (2004) ￿nd reductions in participation in a subset of married women for whom
the EITC creates positive ATRs. By contrast, there is little evidence of e￿ects on hours
worked conditional on participation (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Saez, 2002a).
The mid-1990s EITC expansion was nearly coincident with major reforms to the cash
welfare system, which also attempted to push low-skill single mothers into the labor force. 9
This might have two e￿ects on my analysis. First, it means that my measures of changes
in tax rates ￿ which do not incorporate e￿ective tax rates produced by non-tax transfers ￿
fail to fully capture the changes in the incentives that women faced. This may lead me to
understate the labor supply elasticity. 10 A second e￿ect is that welfare reform may have
induced changes in the skill distribution in the labor force, as women who left welfare to
enter employment likely have lower skill than observably-similar women who were never
on welfare. As I discuss below, this would bias my estimates of changes in equilibrium
wages. Importantly, however, this e￿ect of welfare reform should be concentrated among
single mothers. Measures of wage changes among single women should be free from bias.
As I note below, the EITC’s e￿ects on wages can be identi￿ed from this group alone.
In most states, welfare reform was implemented in late 1996 and 1997, though some
states had waivers from the federal government that permitted changes as early as 1992.
I present a speci￿cation test below that excludes states and time periods potentially
a￿ected by welfare reform; this yields very similar estimates to those obtained from my
main sample.
9There were also changes in food stamps and SSI (Daly and Burkhauser, 2003), and increases in the
value of Medicaid coverage (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001) over the mid-1990s. Both served to increase the
e￿ective tax rate on labor force participation, o￿setting perhaps 30-50% of the ATR reductions created
by the EITC expansion.
10Welfare caseloads declined sharply in 1996 and even more in 1997. This could be a result of the EITC
expansion as much as of welfare reform, as both raised the returns to paid employment relative to welfare
receipt. Mo￿tt (2003b) reviews welfare reform, caseload trends, and state waivers. For contrasting
estimates of the e￿ect of reform on caseloads, see Wallace and Blank (1999) and Figlio and Ziliak (1999).
63 A Simple Tax Incidence Model
A simple partial-equilibrium tax incidence model 11 begins with constant-elasticity supply
and demand functions for homogenous labor:
(2) L
S (w) = (w(1   ))
 and L
D (w) = w
,
where w is the pre-tax wage, w(1   ) is the after-tax (take home) wage, and  < 0 < .












  (1   )
  1
  :
Thus, employers bear a share 
  of taxes￿dlnw =  




  share. The employer share is largest when supply is elastic (  is
large) and demand inelastic (jj is small).
Both  and  can be computed from changes in wages and quantities in response
to a change in the tax rate.12 This only works, however, if there are no shocks to the
parameters of (2). Most importantly, there can be no changes in the production level
beyond those resulting from the tax change itself.
A generalization of the textbook model that allows for heterogeneity of worker skill and
for tax rates that di￿er both across skills and across similarly skilled workers from di￿erent
family types (e.g., married and single workers, with and without children) permits more
￿exible identi￿cation strategies. Across-family type variation in tax rates faced by workers
of the same skill allows robust estimation of the supply elasticity, while across-skill-group
variation identi￿es the demand elasticity even in the presence of unmodeled shocks to
aggregate demand.






, with  < 1:
11A full general equilibrium analysis of tax incidence would incorporate changes in the prices of ￿nal
goods. These will tend to o￿set changes in wages. However, this o￿set will not be con￿ned to the groups
a￿ected by targeted taxes so long as there is trade between groups. Consequently, although a full analysis
of this is beyond the scope of this paper, general equilibrium e￿ects are unlikely to be important to the
distributional analysis.
12This is in contrast to the usual rule that identi￿cation of both supply and demand requires instruments
for each. The key is that the instrument￿the change in tax rates￿is a direct change in price, so the ￿￿rst
stage￿ coe￿cient is itself informative about the parameters: For any (L; w) on the untaxed supply curve,
the taxed supply curve passes through (L; w=(1   )).









;  < 1.
Cost minimization implies a set of labor demand functions of the form
(6) L
D
s =  sw

s;
where ws is the pre-tax wage for skill-s workers,  = 1
 1 < 0, s = b 
s , and   =
 (w1; w2; :::; wS) is a real-valued parameter determined by the level of aggregate de-
mand. Note that wt enters the expressions for Ls, s 6= t, only through  .13
Individuals supply labor with elasticity . Taxes may vary both across skill and,
among workers of the same skill, across demographic groups (indexed by g). Because all
workers of the same skill are substitutes in production, however, the pre-tax wage varies
only across s. The after-tax wage for workers of skill s from group g is thus ws (1   sg),
and the supply of type (s; g) labor is
(7) L
S
sg = (ws (1   sg))
 Nsg;
where Nsg is the number of potential workers. Di￿erentiating (7) and the inverse demand
implied by (6), holding Nsg ￿xed, we obtain
dlnLsg  dlnws   dsg (8a)
dlnws = 
 1 ( dln    dlns + dlnLs): (8b)
Approximating dlnLs  L 1
s
P
k LskdlnLsk and neglecting to solve for the e￿ects of d




















d s   dsg; (9b)
13Teulings (1995, 2005) models job assignment when adjacent skill levels are more substitutable than
are those far apart in the skill distribution. The relevant labor supply for wages (in, e.g., the inverse
version of 6) is then the local average around s, with more weight on points closer to s. As discussed
below, I use kernel regressions to estimate the mean tax change at each skill level as a locally-weighted
average. Up to the choice of kernel, these are exact analogues to the local averages that show up in
Teulings’ model.
8where d s = L 1
s
P
k Lskdsk is the tax rate change for the average skill- s worker. (9b)
indicates that the supply of skill-s workers from group g increases with the across-group
mean tax rate of skill-s workers but decreases with the own-group tax rate. (9a) says
that wages rise with the across-group mean tax rate but not with the own-group rate
conditional on this average. One implication is that a cut in one group’s tax rate ( dsg < 0)
will raise after-tax earnings, ws (1   sg), in that group but will reduce after-tax earnings
for similarly-skilled workers from of other g groups. By contrast, if there is no across- g
variation in tax rates, then equations (9a) and (9b) reduce to the expressions for the
homogeneous labor model.
By (9a), employers bear a share 
  of the change in average taxes, just as in the
homogenous labor model. The distribution of the worker share between groups depends
on the weight of dsg in d s, which re￿ects the extent to which taxed and untaxed workers
participate in the same labor markets. If the groups’ skill distributions are distinct, the
full transfer to/from employers comes from the taxed group, whose wages fall by 
 dsg.
As the untreated group’s share of the skill-s labor market rises, however, jd sj shrinks
relative to jdsgj for the targeted groups and the transfer to employers is funded through
smaller hourly wage reductions spread across more workers, an increasing share of whom
are not directly treated by the tax change.
4 Sources of Identi￿cation
A tax change that varies with both skill and demographic group permits estimation of
supply and demand elasticities without assumptions on aggregate demand. 14 But di￿erent
sources of variation are available to identify the two. A robust estimate of  exploits
within-skill, across-demographic group variation in dsg, using skill group ￿xed e￿ects (in
changes) to absorb the dlns and d s terms in (9b).  is identi￿ed only from across-skill
variation in d s. It can be estimated via the inverse demand function (8b), in which
changes in tax rates can be used to generate exogenous variation in dLs, or by solving
from the coe￿cients of the reduced form equations (9a) and (9b).
In either approach, a correlation between tax changes ( d ) and skill-biased demand
shifts ( dlns) will create bias. Most tax changes are targeted to particular parts of the
14An important issue concerns the lags with which supply and wages respond to the tax change. I
focus on relatively short-run responses, examining data from 1995-1997 for the e￿ects of tax changes
phased in between 1993 and 1996. The long-run supply elasticity may well be larger than that seen in
the short run. Evidence below suggests that the demand side also adjusts slowly, and that wages do not
fall su￿ciently in the short run to absorb all of the women who respond to the EITC by entering the
labor force. If wage responses to supply shocks are larger in the long run than in the short run, I may
understate the share of the EITC captured by employers.
9income distribution, so are correlated with any shifts in the relative demand for high- and
low-skill labor.15 If the rate of technical change can be assumed constant across adjacent
periods that saw di￿erential changes in tax rate policy, it can be di￿erenced away. Adding
a t subscript to index periods (with t = 0; 1), (8b) becomes
(10) dlnwst = 
 1 ( dln t   dlnst + dlnLst):
If dlns1  dlns0 is uncorrelated with d s1  d s0,  1 can be consistently estimated via
an instrumental variables regression of dlnwst on dlnLst, using dln  st as an instrument
and including ￿xed e￿ects for each time period and each skill level to absorb dln t and the
trend component of dlnst, respectively. Identi￿cation comes from di￿erential changes in
 s over the two periods.
In principle, the incidence framework in Section 3 could be extended to the individual
level, allowing for heterogeneity in tax rates and nonlinear tax schedules. 16 Equations (9a)
and (9b) make clear, however, that the key parameters for tax incidence calculations are
the average tax shocks to cells de￿ned at the s-g and s levels. Thus, only tax rates that
vary importantly across cells and that in￿uence aggregate labor supply in each cell are
useful for identi￿cation. Accordingly, I focus on simple summary measures, the marginal
tax rate (MTR) and the average tax rate (ATR), the latter de￿ned as the di￿erence
between the family’s tax bill with and without a woman’s earnings as a share of those
earnings. These can be seen as proxies for labor supply incentives on the intensive and
extensive margins, respectively.17 As (9a) and (9b) indicate, it is the relative importance
of these measures in reduced-form wage and labor supply equations that identi￿es the
parameters of interest.
Because both MTRs and ATRs depend on total annual earnings, the change in tax
rates for workers at skill s is endogenous to unobserved determinants of changes in either
labor supply or hourly wages. An exogenous component of the tax change can be isolated
15Autor et al. (2005a,b), among others, have argued that skill-biased technical change (SBTC) explains
an important part of changes in wage inequality, though others (Card and DiNardo, 2002; Lemieux, 2006)
disagree. SBTC would change the returns to skill, potentially confounding the e￿ects of the EITC. Autor
et al. (2005a) ￿nd that SBTC worked against low-skill workers in the 1980s, lowering their wages, but
that the relative demand for low-skill labor has been shifting upward steadily since around 1987.
16A long literature considers the estimation of labor supply responses to nonlinear tax schedules. See,
e.g., Hausman (1985); Mo￿tt (1990) and Hoynes (1996).
17Analysts often pair MTRs with virtual income, the zero-earnings intercept of the relevant linear
segment of the budget constraint. Conditional on the MTR, variation in women’s virtual income derives
either from the husband’s earnings or from non-labor income. Neither is highly correlated with skill as
de￿ned below and, as a result the across-cell variation in average virtual income has a very low signal-to-
noise ratio. I exclude virtual income from the analyses below, though speci￿cations that include it yield
very similar MTR and ATR coe￿cients.
10by focusing only on changes in rates due to changes in the tax schedule, holding hour and
wage distributions constant. These serve as ￿simulated instruments￿ for actual tax rate
changes (Auten and Carroll, 1999; Gruber and Saez, 2002; Leigh, 2007).
5 Separating Prices and Quantities
The key feature of ￿skill￿ in the incidence model is that workers of the same skill are perfect
substitutes while those of di￿erent skills are not. One option for empirical implementation
is to use use relatively crude skill groupings, dividing workers by, say, education and age.
This is perfectly suitable for labor supply analyses (see, e.g., Blundell et al., 1998; Meyer
and Rosenbaum, 2001), as the tax shock that determines the average labor supply response
in any cell is the average tax rate change in that cell. This approach is less suitable for
analyses of wage e￿ects, however, as workers in di￿erent observables-based cells compete
for the same jobs.18 This means that the average change in labor supply among a cell’s
members does not equal the labor supply shock to the average member’s labor market. Tax
and labor supply changes are smoothed across cells relative to the shocks that are relevant
for prices, creating non-classical measurement error. Inverse labor demand speci￿cations
that use cell-level averages will likely overestimate j 1j, leading to understatement of jj
and overstatement of the employer share of the tax burden.
I do not rely on observed characteristics to identify worker skill. Rather, I assume
that two workers who earn the same wage have the same skill, and that these workers are
freely substitutable even if they have di￿erent education or are in di￿erent occupations
(Teulings, 1995, 2005). This assumption is of course not literally true, but may be seen
as a reasonable approximation, particularly in the low-skill labor market. Under this
assumption, the tax shock that is relevant to a worker’s labor market is the average tax
rate change across workers earning the same hourly wage. 19
With panel data, it would be straightforward to measure the change in each worker’s
labor supply and wage during the period spanning a tax change. Because the available
panel data sets are too small to provide adequate precision, however, I work instead with
repeated cross sections. This requires a strategy for distinguishing between changes in
18Leigh (2007) de￿nes cells based on worker characteristics (e.g., state of residence or education and
age). Gruber (1994) and Gruber and Krueger (1991) also leverage geographic variation in tax regimes,
while Kubik (2004) exploits variation in median wages across occupations. Identi￿cation of wage e￿ects
requires that there be little potential for substitution across cells.
19As developed below, my approach correctly matches wage and tax changes at the same skill level, at
the cost of perhaps smoothing supply responses across cells. Although this should not introduce bias, as
labor supply is an endogenous variable in all speci￿cations, the cell-based strategy is probably preferable
for analysis of labor supply responses.
11the skill composition of the labor force and changes in equilibrium wages for workers
at di￿erent skills. If the EITC attracts low-skill women to enter employment, this will
shift the distribution downward even with no change in any individual worker’s wage; the
distribution will be further shifted if the additional supply reduces the equilibrium price of
low-skill labor. To distinguish these, I adapt DiNardo et al.’s (1996) reweighting strategy
to balance the skill distribution in pre- and post-tax-reform cross sections. 20 If this can
be accomplished, changes in the mapping from skill to wages can be tracked by following
￿xed percentiles of the (reweighted) wage distribution, and the weights used can be seen
as measures of composition changes.
Two assumptions are required. First, the ranking of the wages paid to di￿erent skill
groups is preserved over time; while the relative wages may vary, a higher-skill worker
always earns a higher wage than a lower-skill worker. Second, selection into the labor force
is based on observables; conditional on these, there are no changes in the distribution of
unobserved skill in the labor market.
Let wst = t (s) be the (log) wage for a skill-s worker at time t, where t () is the
(strictly increasing) wage schedule that maps skills to prices. For notational simplicity,
I suppress g subscripts, though the DFL decomposition is carried out independently for
each g group. Let Ft (s) and Gt (w) be the cumulative distributions of skill and wages,
respectively, among workers. At any time the fraction of workers with skill below s must
equal the fraction with wages below wst: Ft (s) = Gt (t (s)) = Gt (wst).
The change in the wage for skill-s labor between t = 0 and t = 1 is:
(11) ws  ws1   ws0 = 1 (s)   0 (s) = G
 1
1 (F1 (s))   G
 1
0 (F0 (s)):
If the skill distribution were ￿xed (F0 = F1 = F), changes in the wage distribution would
necessarily re￿ect changes in the wage schedule, and ws could be estimated as the change
in the pth percentile (p = F (s)) wage:21
(12) ws = G
 1
1 (p)   G
 1
0 (p):
With changes in the skill distribution, the pth percentile will not correspond to the same
skill level over time, and the right side of (12) will confound changes in Ft with changes in
20See also Johnston and DiNardo (1997, Section 11.4.2). Lee (1999) applies the DFL approach to study
the impact of changing real minimum wages. DFL-style reweighting can be seen as a form of propensity
score matching (see, e.g., Hirano et al., 2003).
21In experimental contexts, where the skill distribution may be assumed the same in treatment and
control groups, Abadie et al. (2002) and Bitler et al. (2005) refer to ws as the "quantile treatment
e￿ect."
12t. Under selection on observables, however, it is su￿cient to construct samples in which
the distribution of observable skill correlates is balanced over time. This is accomplished
by re-weighting the period-1 data. I demonstrate below, moreover, that the reweighting
factors themselves can be used to measure the change in labor supply at each skill level.
Let X be a vector of observable characteristics, and assume that the conditional skill
distribution is time-invariant: Ft (s j X) = F (s j X). Let t (X) be the labor-supply-
weighted density of X at time t. We can write the unconditional skill and wage distribu-
tions as
(13) Ft (s) =
Z
Ft (s j X)t (X)dX =
Z
F (s j X)t (X)dX
and












t (w) j X

t (X)dX:
There are two time-varying components in (14), the inverse wage schedule, 
 1
t , and
the distribution of X, t. Let ~ G1 (w) be the counterfactual wage distribution had the
period-1 wage schedule applied with labor supply as in period 0. Then





















This is identical to G1 (w) but for the weighting factor (X)  0 (X)=1 (X). This can
be written as
(16) (X) =
0 (X) + 1 (X)
1 (X)
  1;
where the ￿rst term is the inverse of the propensity score for appearing in period 1. 22
Di￿erences between the actual period-0 wage distribution and the counterfactual dis-
tribution, by assumption, derive solely from changes in the wage schedule:












0 (w) j X

0 (X)dX:
This expression can be inverted to indicate the change in wages at any skill level. The
22I assume for notational simplicity that sample sizes are the same in each period.
13wage change for skill s is then
(18) ws = ~ G
 1
1 (F0 (s))   G
 1
0 (F0 (s)) = e G
 1
1 (F0 (s))   ws0:
The proportional change in the skill density between periods 0 and 1 is
Ls 




f (s j X)1 (X)dX  
R
f (s j X)0 (X)dX R
f (s j X)0 (X)dX
=
R
f (s j X)[1=(X)   1]0 (X)dX R





  1 j s

; (19)
where ft (s) is the time-t density of s and the notation E0 indicates that the expectation
is over the period-0 conditional distribution of X.
The DFL procedure is easily extended to examine changes in labor supply at several
margins. The change in supply due to exogenous changes in population demographic
characteristics can be obtained by estimating the propensity score from the full period-0
and period-1 samples, regardless of labor supply. This yields a reweighting factor 
pop
i for
each period-1 observation. Given this, changes in labor force participation decisions can be
examined by comparing the subsample of labor force participants in t = 0 and reweighted
t = 1 data, using a propensity score computed from these data to construct 
lfp
i . Further












 generates a distinct Ls that describes changes in labor supply at the corresponding
margin. The product of the four s matches the hours-weighted skill distribution across
periods, as needed for computation of ws via (18).23
The required selection-on-observables assumption is unattractive, and its failure will
lead to mis-measurement of wage changes. Recall from above, however, that wage changes
at each skill level are the same for all demographic groups. Thus, dependence on the
selection-on-observables assumption can be lessened by measuring wage changes from
groups that saw small changes in tax rates and, consequently, small changes in observed
skill distributions.
23A version that carries out the reweighting in a single step yields similar estimates of ws.
146 Data
My primary source for measures of wages and labor supply is the Current Population
Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORGs), with observations on hourly wages and
hours worked in the previous week for three to ￿ve thousand female workers each month.
I assemble a pre-reform sample by pooling data from the 1992 and 1993 ORG ￿les, and I
pool data from September 1995 through August 1997 for the post-reform sample. When
I use the pre-reform period to di￿erence out demand shifts, I use the 1988 and 1989 ORG
￿les for the beginning of this period. 24 In each case, the sample consists of women aged
16-64 in primary families. I exclude the self employed, observations with hourly wages
(in real January 1992 dollars) below $1 or above $100, and observations with allocated
wages. Although allocation rates are substantially higher in the post-reform sample than
in the pre-reform sample, the change does not appear to vary with EITC exposure.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the ORG sample. The ￿rst panel presents
statistics for the full sample and for subgroups de￿ned by marital status and the presence
of children. Average ages rose by three to six months over the three year period considered
here, and average education rose by about 0.2 years. 25 Because wages increase with age
and education, this caused reductions in the relative labor supply of low-skill workers
and increases in mean wages, independent of any behavioral changes. The second panel
presents mean characteristics of workers, weighted by the number of weekly hours. Mean
ages and education levels again increased in most groups but not among single mothers,
for whom population shifts were o￿set by relative increases in supply from younger and
less educated single mothers. The ￿nal row presents mean log hourly wages. Changes
are fairly small in each group, with increases among married women and single childless
women and a decline among single women with two or more children, again consistent
with a compositional shift toward lower-skill women.
The ORG ￿les do not report annual income, so do not permit simulation of the tax
rate. I use TAXSIM (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) to simulate the total federal and state
tax burden and the marginal tax rate for each woman in the Annual Demographic Survey
(i.e., the March CPS).26 I use the 1993 and 1994 samples (describing the 1992 and 1993
24Each household appears in the ORG twice, at an interval of one year. To ensure a sample of
unduplicated respondents, I use only observations in their 8th month in sample (i.e. the second ORG
appearance) from 1992 and only those in their 4th month (the ￿rst ORG appearance) from 1989 and
September 1996-August 1997.
25There are two sources of this shift. First, the population age distribution changed somewhat, and
less-educated older individuals were replaced by younger cohorts with higher average education. Second,
in 1994 and 1995 the Bureau of Labor Statistics introduced new sampling weights based on 2000 rather
than on 1990 Census data.
26In complex families, the tax ￿ling unit can be di￿cult to identify. I assume that tax ￿ling units consist
15tax years) for the pre-reform tax computation and the 1996 and 1997 samples (describing
1995 and 1996) for the post-reform computation. A working woman’s ATR is computed
as (yi) (0)=yi, where  (y) is the family’s tax liability when the woman’s earnings are y
and yi are her actual earnings. Ideally, my measures would include the e￿ective tax rates
created by the phase-out of transfer programs ￿ Medicare, SSI, welfare, etc. ￿ as family
earnings rise, but these are di￿cult to measure with any accuracy. My omission of these
programs may lead me to mis-measure changes in tax rates over the mid-1990s. I present a
speci￿cation check below that suggests that the most important contemporaneous change,
welfare reform, does not create major bias in my estimates.
As noted above, my analysis of tax responses is at the level of the demographic and
skill group. I consider six demographic groups de￿ned by the intersection of marital
status (married and single) and number of children (zero, one, and two or more). For
each group in each period, I use the March data to estimate kernel regressions of working
women’s tax rates on their hourly wages. The estimated mean tax rates are then used
for contemporaneous ORG observations of the same family type and wage level. Because
wages are measured more accurately in the ORG than in the March data ￿ where the
hourly wage is computed as the ratio of annual earnings to annual hours worked ￿ there
is some misclassi￿cation in this matching. As we shall see, the identi￿cation of tax e￿ects
relies on gross di￿erences between low-, middle-, and high-skill workers, so is not likely to
be very sensitive to this measurement error.
6.1 Mean tax changes by skill level
Although taxes are functions of annual earnings, in practice there is a strong relationship
between the hourly wage and EITC eligibility. Columns 8, 9, and 10 of Appendix Table
1 list the wage rates at which a full-time, full-year breadwinner would reach the plateau,
the beginning of the phase-out range, and the exhaustion of the credit. The ￿rst of these
is below the federal minimum wage (shown in Column 11) in every schedule. The wage
needed to reach the phase-out range is generally only a bit above the minimum. Two-
income families reach the phase-out even more easily, and are ineligible for the EITC at
all if both parents work full time at wages a bit above the minimum.
The dotted lines in Figures 2 (MTRs) and 3 (ATRs) show the change in mean tax
rates ￿ including the EITC and all other federal and state taxes but not the employer
of a woman, her husband (if present), and any resident children (under 18) of either. I drop members of
subfamilies, except children who could be claimed by the head of the household (e.g., her grandchildren).
I do not count resident children aged 18-24, though they can count toward EITC eligibility under some
circumstances. As in the ORG data I discard duplicate March observations on the same households.
16share of payroll taxes ￿ among workers at the same real wage level between 1992/3 and
1995/6. This is a poor measure of the tax shock to skill-speci￿c labor markets, as the
same real wage may correspond to di￿erent skill levels at di￿erent times. The ￿gures also
show two methods of adjusting for this. First, I use the estimates developed below of the
change in wage schedules between 1992/3 and 1995/7 to identify the wage level paid in
the latter period to workers of the same skill as those who earned wage w in 1992/3. For
example, my estimates indicate that a single, childless woman whose skills were valued
at $5 per hour in 1992 would have earned $5.21 (in 1992 dollars) in 1996; the solid lines
in ￿gures thus compare mean MTRs and ATRs of $5 workers in 1992 to those of women
earning $5.21 in 1996.
Observed tax rate changes are endogenous to changes in the quantity and price of
labor at each skill level, as unobserved shocks to annual earnings may lead to changes in
tax rates. I form simulated instruments for the changes in tax rates by comparing rates
obtained by applying 1995 tax schedules to the observed 1992/3 data with the actual
1992/3 tax rates.27 These are shown by dashed lines in Figures 2 and 3. 28
The various methods yield very similar estimates of tax changes, both within and
between groups. Figure 2 shows that mean MTRs fell for single mothers with two or
more children and very low pre-expansion wages but rose for those with wages between
about $5 and $12. This corresponds to the segments of the credit: Workers at wages
around $5 are typically in the phase-in range, while those at higher wages are more likely
to be in the phase-out. Among single women with just one child and, to a much lesser
extent, among married mothers, mean MTRs rose at all wages below $12. 29 Mean ATRs
fell for single working mothers at all wages below about $11 (Figure 3), with the largest
declines at the lowest wages and in multiple-child families. Low-wage married mothers
saw slight increases in mean ATRs, as the EITC’s phase out taxes secondary workers’
earnings. Despite the extension of a very small EITC to women without children, these
groups show essentially no change in average ATRs and MTRs.
27To incorporate bracket creep, the tendency for rates to change as in￿ation and real wage growth shift
workers into higher tax brackets, I in￿ate 1992/3 earnings by the CPI plus 1% per year before simulating
the counterfactual schedule.
28I treat marital status and number of children as exogenous to the EITC. Although the credit rules
create incentives to remain single and to have more children, there is little evidence for sizable e￿ects on
these margins (Baughman and Dickert-Conlin, 2006; Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 2002).
29A proportionate expansion of the EITC would have reduced MTRs for very low-wage single women
with one child. This is o￿set by a slight leftward shift in the C=1 kink point for this group (Figure 1),
which moved some high-hour workers from the phase-in range to the plateau and raised their MTRs.
176.2 Di￿erence-in-di￿erences and DDDD estimates
Some simple regressions illustrate the variation that I exploit. Assuming that ATRs are
more important determinants of labor supply than MTRs￿this assumption is supported
by the existing literature and by the results below￿Figure 3 indicates that low-skill single
women with children were "treated" by the EITC expansion, relative to higher-skill,
married, or childless women. We should therefore expect increased labor supply among
these women, and reduced wages for all low-skill women.
I begin by estimating a ￿exible speci￿cation for log hourly wages using the pre-reform
data. I use the resulting coe￿cients to form a "skill index"￿predicted wage￿for each
observation in both pre- and post-reform data, which I standardize to have zero mean
and unit variance. I then estimate a regression of labor supply on the skill index; indicators
for being unmarried, for having children, and for appearing in the post-reform data; and
all two-, three-, and four-way interactions of these variables. Because low-skilled single
women with children in the post-reform period were "treated" with reduced ATRs, the
expected labor supply response to the EITC would produce a negative coe￿cient on the
four-way interaction.
Column 1 of Table 2 presents marginal e￿ects from a probit model for labor force
participation, estimated on the ORG data. Estimates are negative and signi￿cant for both
one- and two-or-more-child families, though the two-child estimate is substantially larger
in magnitude. This is exactly the pattern we would expect if participation responds to tax
incentives. Column 2 presents a model for employment. The estimates have the same signs
and the same relative magnitudes, though both are smaller than in Column 1 (and only the
two-child coe￿cient is signi￿cant). Evidently, only a portion of the participation impact
of the reform is re￿ected in increased employment. Column 3 presents a linear model
for weekly hours conditional on employment. There is no indication of an impact here.
Column 4 combines the previous two outcomes, modeling total weekly hours per person.
The participation e￿ect dominates here and the point estimate for two-child families is
consistent with shifts solely between non-employment and near full-time employment (-
0.885/-0.028=31.6 hours per worker), though the estimate is imprecise.
Column 5 presents a model for log hourly wages. Recall that the EITC should have
had the same e￿ect on the wages of ineligible women as it did on those of eligible women
in the same labor market, so the four-way interaction coe￿cients should be zero. One is
signi￿cantly negative, a result that disappears in the more sophisticated analysis below.
I also show the two-way skill-time interaction and the three-way interaction of these with
marital status. The former should capture any incidence e￿ects if all women compete in
the same labor market, while the latter is more relevant if single women are in a distinct
18market. Both coe￿cients are zero, indicating no wage changes of the form that incidence
models would imply. Again, these results are not robust to more careful controls for
changes in the skill composition of labor and in labor demand.
7 Results
7.1 Decomposing labor supply and wage changes
I begin by applying the DFL reweighting strategy to distinguish changes in labor supply
from changes in the wage schedule. Pooling data from 1992/3 and 1995/7, I estimate
propensity scores for appearing in the later data. The propensity score model is estimated
by probit, and includes the full interaction of four education dummies and eight potential
experience categories; separate intercepts, linear education terms, and quadratic potential
experience terms for whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians; the number of children under
age six; state ￿xed e￿ects; and indicators for residence in a metropolitan area and in
a central city. All are fully interacted with marital status and indicators for zero, one,
and two or more children. As noted earlier, I compute a sequence of propensity scores,
weighting by di￿erent measures of labor supply. I use each to compute the corresponding
weights ^ i. I then estimate Ls via family-type-speci￿c kernel regressions (using an






on wi using period-0
data.30
Demographic shifts produce changes in the skill composition of labor supply that are
exogenous to tax rates. I begin by ￿cleaning out￿ purely demographic changes, reweighting
the full CPS samples ￿ irrespective of labor force participation ￿ to balance the distribution
of observables over time. With balanced population samples, I can consider changes in
labor supply decisions, beginning with labor force participation. As described above, I use
labor force participants from the 1992/3 and 1995/7 samples to estimate a probit model
for appearance in the latter period, then use the ￿tted values to compute reweighting
factors. Figure 4 graphs estimated changes in labor force participation, Llfp
gs , against
the 1992/3 wage, ws0. The shaded areas also show 90% pointwise con￿dence intervals.
Participation rates rose for all groups and all wages, but not evenly. There are large
skill-biased changes in participation among single mothers, with dramatic increases at
the bottom of the skill distribution. These increases are largest for women with two or
30Inference is conducted via bootstrap with 600 replications. I select bootstrap samples (with replace-
ment) from the ORG data and re-estimate the propensity score on each bootstrap sample. I construct
pointwise 90% con￿dence intervals for ^ ws and ^ Ls as the range between the 5th and 95th percentiles
of the distribution of estimates across bootstrap replications..
19more children, among whom participation rates grew by as much as forty percent.
After again reweighting the data to balance the observable characteristics of labor
force participants, I estimate a third propensity score to describe changes in employment
conditional on participation. Figure 5 shows that conditional employment rates declined
among low-skill women of all six demographic groups and particularly among single moth-
ers. Some of the new labor force participants from Figure 4 evidently transitioned into
unemployment rather than into employment. Changes in conditional employment are
smaller than those in participation, so unconditional employment (not shown) has a pat-
tern like that for participation though with a smaller scale.
Finally, Figure 6 displays intensive-margin changes in usual weekly hours conditional
on employment.31 There is no indication of large changes on this margin, either across
demographic groups or across skill levels within groups. Thus, when I combine the three
reweighting factors to obtain the change in total weekly hours per woman (Figure 7),
the extensive margin changes dominate. Hours rose substantially among low-skill single
women with two or more children, rose by a smaller amount among one-child single
mothers, and declined somewhat for low-skill married mothers (this is driven by the
unemployment e￿ect discussed earlier). This pattern of changes is exactly what we might
have predicted from the EITC expansion, which created large incentives for low-skill single
mothers, particularly those with two children, to enter the labor force. 32
The reweighting procedure provides informative measures of labor supply changes, but
its primary value is to permit measurement of changes in the price of skill. Changes in
the wage schedule are graphed as solid lines in Figure 8, with the 1992/3 log wage on the
horizontal axis. The shaded area shows con￿dence intervals. For comparison, the dashed
line indicates the change in the wage distribution unadjusted for composition changes.
This is merely a Q-Q plot for log wages, ￿attened by subtracting the t = 0 log wage from
the t = 1 series to make changes more visible.
To illustrate the computation, consider the 10th percentile of the single childless
women’s wage distribution in 1992/3, $4:86. The 10th percentile wage for this group
in 1995/7 is $5:14, and ln(5:14)   ln(4:86) = 0:056, so (4:86; 0:056) is one point on the
dashed line in the upper left panel of Figure 8. There were increases between 1992/3
and 1995/7 in the share of single childless women’s labor coming from high-skill women,
31I perform two additional reweighting steps: self employment rates conditional on employment, before
the hours analysis, and wage allocation rates, after the hours analysis. Changes on these margins are
uncorrelated with tax rate changes (see Table 4, below).
32Eissa and Hoynes (2004) ￿nd that low-skill married mothers with husbands whose earnings placed
the family in the phase-out range reduced their labor force participation in response to the 1993 EITC
expansion. Only a small fraction of working married women faced this incentive, however, so their
response does not have detectable e￿ects on the aggregate supply of labor.
20driven primarily by population aging. This pushed ￿xed skill points downward in the
distribution, so the skill level that was at the 10th percentile of the 1992/3 distribution
was lower in the distribution in 1995/7. The reweighted 1995/7 data adjust for this. In
these data, the 10th percentile wage was $5:05, so the skill group whose labor sold for
$4.86 in 1992/3 saw that price rise by 3:8% by 1995/7, not the 5:6% indicated by the raw
change in the wage distribution, and the solid line passes through (4:86; 0:038).
The naive estimates indicate rising inequality among married women, and particularly
among married women with children. This derives to a large extent from demographic
changes rather than from shifts in the wage schedule. Composition-corrected wage changes
for married women are approximately zero, except that the returns to very high skills
increased among married women with two or more children. 33 For single women ￿ whose
labor market was most a￿ected by the EITC expansion ￿ wages rose or were stable at the
bottom of the distribution (initial wages below about $6.50), fell in an absolute or at least
relative sense in the middle, and were roughly stable at the top. There is little evidence of
across-the-board reductions in relative or absolute wages for mid- and low-skill women, as
would be expected if the increased labor supply from single mothers in these skill groups
bid down market wages and if there were no countervailing shifts in demand. Indeed, the
most prominent change is the increase in wages at the bottom of the distribution relative
to the middle. Finally, note that wage schedule changes are generally similar for single
women with and without children, suggesting that the former estimates are not greatly
biased by selection on unobservables.
A potential explanation for the rise in low-skill workers’ wages is that the positive shock
to relative labor supply produced by the EITC was overwhelmed by a technical change-
driven increase in relative demand. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that technical change
during the mid-1990s favored low-skill over medium-skill labor (Autor et al., 2005a).
That evidence indicates that the rate of technical change was approximately constant
from around 1987 through the late 1990s. If so, it may be possible to di￿erence out the
e￿ects of demand shifts. I repeat the DFL procedure using 1988-89 and 1992-93 data to
eliminate the e￿ect of compositional shifts during the earlier period, then compute the
change in wages at skill levels corresponding to points in the 1992-3 wage distribution.
Wage patterns over this earlier period are qualitatively similar to those in Figure 8, with
rising relative wages for the lowest-skilled workers. This lends support to the SBTC
explanation. There were no large changes in labor supply in the earlier period.
33The pattern here ￿ composition-corrected changes resembling those produced by changes in observ-
ables and diverging from those seen in other groups ￿ seems consistent with changes in the distribution
of unobservables. As this group is not central to my analysis, which focuses on low-skill single women, I
do not pursue it further.
217.2 Within-skill analyses of labor supply responses
Having estimated the change in the supply and price of labor at each skill level and in
each demographic group, I can now relate these changes to the changes in mean tax rates
shown in Figures 2 and 3. I create a data set consisting of the estimates of Lgs and wgs
for each of the six family structure groups at skill levels corresponding to half percentiles
of the 1992/3 wage distribution, and merge these to estimates of gs obtained from the
March data for the corresponding demographic group and wage level. 34
I begin by modeling supply in isolation, comparing identically-skilled workers across
family types. Equation (9b) suggests that an appropriate speci￿cation is
(20) Lgs = Ag + B (s) + gs  C + "gs;
where Lgs is the change in labor supply at skill s from family type g and gs is the
change in mean tax rates. B (s) is a skill level control, and must be su￿ciently ￿exible
to absorb any across-skill in￿uences on supply, including the d s and dlns e￿ects from
equation (9b).
Table 3 presents estimates of (20). 35 The dependent variable in each speci￿cation is the
change in per capita weekly hours worked. I use data from all six family structure groups
in Panel A and from only single women in Panel B, and I consider three tax measures:
the marginal tax rate (MTR) in "Model 1," the average tax rate (ATR) in "Model 2,"
and both together in "Model 3." I report only the C coe￿cients, which estimate -1 times
the supply elasticity with respect to either the marginal (MTR) or average (ATR) wage.
I use three speci￿cations for B (s). It is omitted in column 1. In column 2, B (s) is a
simple linear control for the log wage in the base year. In column 3, I include ￿xed e￿ects
for each skill level, thereby removing all restrictions on B (s). In this speci￿cation, C is
identi￿ed only from within-skill, across-demographic-group variation in tax rate changes.
Finally, in Columns 4-6 I instrument for the the change in tax rates with the simulated
instrument, the predicted change from pre-reform data.
When the ATR and MTR are entered separately in OLS speci￿cations using all women,
each is signi￿cant. The estimated elasticity of supply with respect to the marginal wage is
around 0.3, and the elasticity with respect to the average wage is 0.57. When the two tax
34I discard the top and bottom 3 percentiles, leaving 187 skill groups. I discuss in Section 8 the
possibility of serial correlation between observations in adjacent skill groups.
35As above, I use the bootstrap for inference, re-estimating the DFL reweighting factors and regression
(20) on each of 600 bootstrap draws from the underlying microdata. I compute standard errors as 0.74
times the interquartile range of the coe￿cients across draws. This is robust to tail behavior ￿ which is a
problem in some of the IV speci￿cations, where one or two replications yield ￿rst stage coe￿cients very
near to zero ￿ and estimates the standard deviation if the distribution is normal.
22variables are entered together, however, the MTR e￿ect disappears￿the point estimates
fall to approximately zero, and are insigni￿cant￿while the ATR e￿ect remains. The ATR
e￿ect is moreover robust to instrumentation and to the exclusion of married women, while
the estimated MTR e￿ects are small and insigni￿cant in these speci￿cations.
The estimates in Table 3 thus indicate sizable supply elasticities with respect to the
average wage, but no e￿ect of marginal wages on hours worked. To probe further, I use the
successive propensity score models described in Section 7.1 to examine the various margins
of labor supply separately. Table 4 presents speci￿cations similar to those in Table 3, Panel
B, Column 6. The ￿rst panel presents results for each margin of the DFL decomposition:
Population size (row 1), labor force participation (2), employment if participating (3), non-
self-employment if employed (4), hours if employed (5), and non-allocated, valid wages (6).
The patterns match those seen in Figures 4 through 7: MTRs have essentially no e￿ect
on any margin of labor supply. ATR e￿ects on participation are signi￿cant and large,
indicating an elasticity with respect to the average wage around 1.1-1.2. By contrast,
the coe￿cient for employment conditional on participation is positive, suggesting that
employment rates (i.e., one minus the unemployment rate) have an elasticity of about
-0.35 with respect to a woman’s average wage. Neither ATRs nor MTRs a￿ect hours
conditional on employment, rates of self employment, or wage allocation.
The second panel presents several interesting combinations of the labor supply mea-
sures. The overall employment elasticity (row 7) combines the participation response and
the smaller, o￿setting employment response, for a net ATR e￿ect around  0:6. Hours
per person (row 8) have a slightly larger response. On the other hand, this is somewhat
o￿set by demographic shifts, so the ATR e￿ect on total hours worked (row 9) at each skill
level is smaller and insigni￿cant.
The results thus appear to indicate that responses are exclusively on the extensive
margin, consistent with the strong e￿ect of ATRs rather than MTRs. Because only one
week’s labor supply is observed in the ORG data, however, they cannot distinguish true
extensive margin responses from intensive responses that take the form of changes in weeks
worked per year. To examine this issue, Rows 10 and 11 show estimates for changes in
the probability of annual labor force participation and in annual hours conditional on
participation, both computed from the March data. The March sample is smaller than
the ORG and the estimates are imprecise. However, the results are at least consistent
with a response that is solely on the margin of annual participation.
Finally, row 12 presents models in which the dependent variable is the log hourly
wage. Recall that the speci￿cations in this table include skill ￿xed e￿ects while demand
is in theory constant across demographic groups at the same skill level, so the coe￿cients
23should be zero. On the other hand, if new labor force entrants drawn in by the EITC
expansion are selected on unobservables, this would bias the estimated wage changes for
EITC-a￿ected groups and would likely yield a non-zero coe￿cient in these models. Both
ATR and MTR coe￿cients here are almost exactly zero.
7.3 Across-skill analyses of wage changes
I now return to the two equation system, (9), and I exclude skill ￿xed e￿ects in favor of
the across-group mean tax rate changes. I compute  s as the across-g average of the
change in tax rates, gs, with groups weighted by their shares of pre-expansion skill- s
labor supply. I explore two constructions of this average: over all six groups (married and
single by zero, one, and two or more children) and only over the three groups of single
women. The ￿rst is appropriate if all women compete in the same labor market, while
the second is better if single and married women participate in distinct labor markets.
(This possibility is suggested by the series in Figure 8, which indicate divergences between
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g represent demographic group ￿xed e￿ects and the ws0 controls are
included to absorb any SBTC or cyclical factors that are linear in the base log wage. As
in (9a), the own-group change in taxes is excluded from the wage equation (21b). 36
The ￿rst column of Table 5 reports the correspondence between the coe￿cients of equa-
tions (21a) and (21b) and the underlying elasticity parameters. I include two additional
regressors measuring purely demographic change in the labor force, which is gradually ag-
ing and becoming more educated. Even in the absence of behavioral changes, the supply
of high-skill labor would have risen relative to low-skill labor. A straightforward extension
of the earlier model incorporates shifts in labor supply coming from demographic changes:
Exogenous supply increases drive down the wage and thereby reduce endogenous supply. 37
36I have also estimated speci￿cations that include this term, which should have absorbed biases in my
measure of wgs coming from di￿erential changes in unobservables for single mothers. Its coe￿cient was
always small and insigni￿cantly di￿erent from zero, and other coe￿cients were largely una￿ected.
37Whether purely demographic changes in the skill composition of the labor force have the same impacts
on equilibrium wages as do behavioral shifts in labor supply behavior depends on many factors, including
the openness of the U.S. economy and life-cycle patterns in consumption. Speci￿cations that constrain
the population e￿ects to zero give nearly identical results.
24Columns 2 and 3 present estimates of (21a) and (21b). I use as dependent variables
the changes in labor supply and wages for single women, stacking observations for the
zero-child, one-child, and two-or-more-children groups. Following the results in Tables
3 and 4, I focus on ATRs, instrumenting for gs with the simulated change in the s-g
cell and for  s with the average of this across g. In Column 2, I treat single women
as a distinct labor market, and average ATRs only across single women. In Column 3,
I instead assume that all women participate in the same labor market, and I include
married women’s tax rates in the ATR average.
The own-group tax rate coe￿cients for labor supply are similar to those in Table 3.
Population coe￿cients are also reasonable, though imprecisely estimated. The coe￿cients
on the across-group average ATR, however, take the wrong signs in both the labor supply
and wage equations and in both speci￿cations, and the wage e￿ects are signi￿cant. Skill
groups whose mean ATRs fell the most saw increased wages and expanded labor supply
among EITC-ineligible women.
This result suggests that tax e￿ects are confounded by skill-biased demand shifts. An
exogenous increase in the relative demand for low-skill labor would have raised wages at
skill levels where  s is negative, potentially producing the observed pattern of coe￿-
cients. As noted earlier, by augmenting the sample with data on wage and labor supply
changes between 1988 and 1992, I can add skill-group ￿xed e￿ects to (21a) and (21b).
These absorb any technical change that proceeded at the same rate over the two win-
dows.38 I also include an interaction of time with the 1992 log wage, to allow for "tilting"
in the form of technical change over time or for cyclical e￿ects. Tax e￿ects are identi-
￿ed from nonlinearities in the across-skill relationship between log wages and the second
di￿erence of (simulated) tax rates.
Estimates are reported in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 5. These are much more reason-
able, though imprecise. In particular, we now see the expected positive coe￿cient on the
mean ATR in the wage equation, though this is only signi￿cant in Column 5. The mean
ATR coe￿cients in the labor supply equation are not clearly positive, but positive values
are well within the con￿dence intervals. 39
38There are two potential confounding factors here: The 1988-92 and 1992-96 periods come at di￿erent
points in the business cycle, and the federal minimum wage was raised in 1990 and 1991. To avoid the
e￿ects of the latter, I exclude skill levels whose 1992/3 wages were below $4.38, the peak real value of
the minimum wage over this period, from the stacked analysis. Business cycle e￿ects are harder to deal
with, as there is no expansionary period other than the 1992-1996 period that had similar SBTC trends
but no policy-induced labor supply shocks. Relative demand for low-skill labor is generally thought to be
pro-cyclical (Hoynes, 2000). This suggests the comparison of relative wage changes for low-skill workers
in 1988-1992 and 1992-1996 will tend to indicate overly elastic demand.
39The elasticity parameters can be recovered from the coe￿cients in Table 5 via optimal minimum
distance (Abowd and Card, 1989), with three overidentifying restrictions. Estimates are quite noisy,
257.4 Inverse demand speci￿cations
A more direct method of estimating the demand elasticity is via an inverse demand
equation. This also permits me to examine the possibility that selection-on-unobservables
leads to mismeasurement of wage changes in groups that were directly a￿ected by the
EITC expansion. I estimate speci￿cations of the form
(22) wgs = Dg + ws0  E + Lgs  F + Ls  G + vgs:
Here, Ls is the proportional change in skill-s labor, averaged across demographic groups.
When Ls is instrumented by the simulated change in tax rates, G estimates the inverse
of the demand elasticity,  1. The same potential biases arise here as in Table 5. First,
wage changes (wgs) may be mis-measured if the selection-on-observables assumption is
violated. Second, the estimated inverse demand elasticity will be confounded by any shifts
in labor demand that are correlated across skill groups with the simulated instrument. To
investigate the former issue, I distinguish between measures of wgs for groups directly
a￿ected by the EITC expansion, among whom there were large composition changes, and
for those not directly a￿ected, among whom the observables composition of labor supply
did not change meaningfully. For the latter, I again use the 1988-1992 period to attempt
to di￿erence out demand shifts.
If the various groups are indeed perfect substitutes in production, wgs should not vary
across g groups. I do not impose this constraint in the DFL decomposition, so empirically
^ wgs varies slightly with g. Inclusion of Lgs (instrumented with gs) in (22) can
be seen as a test of the selection-on-observables assumption. A non-zero estimated F
coe￿cient would indicate that bias in ^ wgs is correlated with the tax change across s-g
cells.
Table 6 presents estimates. The ￿rst two columns stack observations on wage changes
between 1992 and 1996 for all three groups of single women. In the ￿rst, the key regressor
is the change in labor supply among single women, the appropriate measure of the supply
shock if single women form a distinct labor market. The estimate indicates a sizable,
positive wage response to the EITC-induced increase in labor supply; the e￿ect of a 1%
increase in supply is to increase wages by 1.21% (s.e. 0.54%). As in Table 5, this is counter
to the theoretical prediction that supply increases will drive prices downward. Column 2
replaces the average supply change among single women with that among all women, as
would be appropriate if all participate in the same labor market. The coe￿cient is much
larger than that in Column 1, but it is imprecisely estimated; there is again no evidence
however, and the restrictions are rejected in each speci￿cation.
26that measured wage changes in each group are correlated with own-group tax rates.
There is no indication in Columns 1 and 2 that selection-on-unobservables biases wage
measurements, as both of the own-group labor supply coe￿cients are approximately zero.
As another check, however, Columns 3 and 4 use only single, childless women’s wage
changes for the dependent variable. There were no notable changes in the distribution of
observed characteristics in this group, and the selection-on-observables assumption is quite
plausible here. The coe￿cient on the own-group change in labor supply is constrained to
zero in these columns, as there is no instrument for this group’s supply. We still see large
positive coe￿cients on the all-single-women and all-women changes in labor supply. The
￿nal row of the table converts the estimates of the coe￿cient G to a demand elasticity,
 = G 1. This is positive in each of the ￿rst four columns, signi￿cantly so in Columns 1
and 3.
The estimates in Columns 1-4 of Table 6, like those in Table 5, appear consistent
with a positive shock to the relative demand for low-skill labor. I can again attempt to
remove this e￿ect by adding data on wage changes between 1988 and 1992. As before, the
identifying assumption is that SBTC was approximately constant over the two periods,
and is therefore absorbed by skill ￿xed e￿ects. As in the earlier speci￿cations, I also include
a time-speci￿c linear term in the base log wage to allow for tilting of demand trends over
time. The augmented ^ G estimates (Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6) take on the correct sign,
indicating that a 1% increase in the quantity of labor supplied reduces wages by 3.6%
(if single women constitute the labor market) or 2.7% (if the market includes married
women). These coe￿cients imply small but negative demand elasticities, -0.28 in Column
5 and -0.37 (insigni￿cant) in Column 6. This aligns closely with Hamermesh’s (1993) "best
guess" for the constant-output demand elasticity of -0.3. However, my estimates imply
much less elastic demand than do those that are identi￿ed from immigration-induced
shocks to the supply of low-skill labor, where the implied demand elasticities range from
-2.5 or -3 (Borjas, 2003) to negative in￿nity (i.e. perfectly elastic) (Card, 2005).
8 Robustness
I discuss in this section several possible biases that have not yet been addressed. I begin
with two that do not seem able to account for the pattern of results presented so far.
First, the minimum wage might have constrained wages from falling for the lowest-skill
workers, perhaps producing the increase in relative wages observed at the bottom of the
skill distribution between 1992/3 and 1995/7. Attribution of this to the minimum wage
requires that the minimum have extremely large spillover e￿ects: Figure 8 indicates that
27the decline in wages starts above around $6 per hour, in a period when the minimum
wage hovered around $4.25. A similar pattern is seen between 1988 and 1992. Relative
wages rose at the bottom of the distribution, but this increase extended well beyond
the plausible reach of the minimum wage. It seems more plausible that the increase is
attributable to shifts in demand than to legislated wage ￿oors.
Second, wages may be misleading about changes in worker compensation. Most EITC-
eligible women saw their marginal tax rates increase; although this does not seem to have
a￿ected labor supply, it should have raised the value of untaxed work amenities (e.g.
￿exible schedules) or bene￿ts (health or child care) relative to cash wages, perhaps leading
to changes in the composition of compensation. This would be consistent with the decline
in relative wages between 1992 and 1996 among mid-skill mothers, as these are the women
whose MTRs rose the most. It is not consistent, however, with the similar wage responses
for childless single women, for whom MTRs did not change dramatically. 40
Table 7 presents estimates that investigate two other potential sources of bias. The
￿rst is serial correlation. I have treated each half percentile of the pre-expansion female
wage distribution as a separate labor market. This is a strong assumption ￿ shocks to the
labor market at one skill level probably spill over into the markets for labor at adjacent
skill levels.41 To allow for this, I re-estimated my preferred speci￿cations for labor supply
and demand on subsamples consisting of more widely spaced skill groups. Row 1 of Table
7 repeats the preferred estimates from the earlier tables (Model 1 from Table 3, Column
6, Panel B for supply and Column 5 of Table 6 for demand). Rows 2 and 3 restrict the
sample to observations corresponding to every 2 or 3.5 percentiles. 42 This has essentially
no e￿ect on the estimated elasticities or their standard errors.
A second issue is the near coincidence of the EITC expansion and major reform of
the U.S. welfare system, aimed largely at moving recipients into paid employment. I can
investigate the e￿ect of welfare reform on my analyses by attempting to exclude from
the sample observations that were a￿ected. I drop all observations from 14 states that
implemented welfare reform before late 1996, as well as all observations from any state
from the 1997 ORG ￿les￿leaving October 1995 through December 1996 as the "post"
40One might imagine that employers are constrained in the variety of compensation packages they can
o￿er, and that a shift in one group’s preferences pulls the average package in that direction. Unfortunately,
I not aware of data on non-wage compensation with su￿cient detail to permit evaluation of this sort of
hypothesis.
41Serial correlation could also arise from sampling error in estimated wage and labor supply changes.
The bootstrap standard errors should correctly account for this, but cannot account for "true" spillovers.
42The base speci￿cation uses 187 skill groups. These correspond to 199 half percentiles of the 1992 wage
distribution, excluding the top and bottom three percentiles. (The demand analyses exclude additional
groups at the bottom of the distribution that might have been a￿ected by the minimum wage between
1988 and 1992.) Rows 2 and 3 use 47 and 27 skill groups, respectively.
28period￿then reestimate labor supply and wage responses on the shrunken data set. 43 Row
4 of Table 7 presents the resulting elasticity estimates. These are noisier than those from
the main sample, but point estimates are similar and if anything indicate a larger (more
negative) demand elasticity.
The ￿nal column of Table 7 shows the employer share of tax incidence that is implied
by the estimates in the earlier columns. Rows 1 through 3 show that employers bear
approximately 3/4 of any taxes (and capture the same share of subsidies). Row 4 implies
a smaller but still substantial employer share. I discuss the implications of these estimates
for the distributional e￿ects of the EITC below.
9 Discussion
This paper has used the labor supply shock induced by the mid-1990s EITC expansion
to investigate the labor market e￿ects of income taxes. I extend the traditional incidence
model to allow for multiple skill groups and tax schedules, and derive the implications of
targeted taxes for wages and labor supply. The extended model shows promise for the
empirical evaluation of the incidence of federal taxes, which are otherwise di￿cult to study
given their uniformity across space and their spillover e￿ects on untaxed participants in
the same labor markets as those facing the tax.
The EITC provides useful variation, as it creates high e￿ective tax rates targeted
at low-skill workers. Previous work has demonstrated sizable labor supply responses
to the EITC expansion. Tax induced supply shocks are the key to identi￿cation of tax
incidence, and it is di￿cult to imagine another plausible policy change that would produce
shocks larger than those created by the EITC in the low-wage labor market. I extend
methods proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996) to obtain semiparametric estimates of wage
and labor supply changes among women of di￿erent skills, then explore several strategies
for estimating their relationship to changes in the tax schedule.
The clearest result is that the EITC expansion led to increased labor force partic-
ipation of low-skill single mothers. Consistent with earlier evidence, women appear to
have responded to their average tax rates rather than to marginal rates. Implied supply
43The excluded states received major waivers to impose time limits or stricter-than-usual work require-
ments before September 1996: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana,
North Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin (Bitler et al., 2005;
Crouse, 1999). This strategy would not work if welfare reform in the remaining states had e￿ects on
labor supply before it was implemented. One component of the reform package was lifetime time limits
on welfare receipt. In models with job search or hysteresis, the expectation of future limits can lead to
anticipatory changes in labor supply. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the most important e￿ects of
welfare reform occurred after its implementation.
29elasticities are reasonable, in the 0.5 - 1.0 range. Taking the employment elasticity of 0.6
from row 7 of Table 4, changes in average tax rates account for 26% of the 4.1 percent-
age point increase between 1992/3 and 1995/7 in the weekly employment rate of single
mothers relative to single childless women. 44
The more novel contribution of the paper is its analysis of wage responses. Wages
rose between 1992 and 1996 for the skill groups experiencing the largest supply shocks.
Taken literally, this implies a large positive demand elasticity. Further investigation in-
dicates that this result re￿ects the confounding e￿ects of contemporaneous skill-biased
changes in the production technology. A speci￿cation that allows for a constant rate of
technical change between 1988 and 1996 yields negative but relatively inelastic demand.
If anything, this elasticity is still somewhat downward biased by my inability to control
for business cycle e￿ects. The evidence thus suggests that the EITC expansion put sub-
stantial downward pressure on low-skill wages, but that this was o￿set by demand shifts
favoring low-skill workers.45
The EITCs incidence depends on the supply and demand elasticities and on the overlap
of eligible and ineligible groups’ skill distributions. I simulate an expansion of the EITC
that is large enough to increase total payments by $1, distributed across single mothers
of various skills in proportion to the mid-1990s expansion. I assume that the supply
elasticity is 0.73 with respect to average tax rates and zero with respect to marginal rates,
and that the elasticity of demand for single women’s labor is -0.28.
Table 8 presents the distributional e￿ects. Row 1 shows the tax credits. Rows 2A-2D
show the resulting changes in earnings, decomposed into components due to changes in
supply, changes in wages, and a residual component: (wL) = L  w + w  L +
(L)(w).
The credit induces single mothers to enter the labor force, driving down wages and, in
turn, reducing the labor force participation of single women with and without children.
Employers of low-skill workers capture a substantial portion of the credit via reduced
wage bills, 72 cents per dollar of EITC spending with the parameters used here. 46 Equally
44This is on top of a 15% share deriving from changes in the demographic composition of the workforce.
These shares are nearly identical to those estimated by Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001). Grogger (2002)
estimates a very similar EITC share of changes in single mothers’ weeks worked between 1993 and 1999.
Looney (2005) estimates a larger EITC e￿ect, though because his total change is also larger he assigns
the EITC a smaller share.
45The result from Figure 5 and Table 4 that the unemployment rate of low-skill women rose between
1992/3 and 1995/7 appears di￿cult to square with a positive shock to demand. It seems most easily
interpreted as the result of labor market frictions: If the employers do not immediately adjust to labor
supply increases by adding jobs, short-run unemployment will result. This will be concentrated among
the new entrants, as in Figure 5, but some may spill over to other groups as job changers search longer
for openings.
46These parameters may not be exactly right, of course, and con￿dence intervals for this calculation
30interesting is the incidence of this transfer on eligible and ineligible workers. All single
women at the same skill level see the same change in their hourly wages, but because
ineligible childless women form the bulk of the low-skill labor market, they also bear most
of the resulting burden (row 2B). While eligible women’s supply rises, that of ineligible
women falls as a consequence of the reduction in wages. The net change in total labor
supply is positive but small (row 2A), only 0.20 as compared with the 0.73 that would
obtain with ￿xed wages. Total earnings fall by just over half as much as is spent on the
program (row 2D), with larger reductions among childless women and moderate increases
among women with children. All of these e￿ects, of course, are concentrated among
low-wage workers.
Row 3 of the table presents the total transfer, equal to the sum of tax credits and
changes in wage rates. The transfer to the EITC’s intended bene￿ciaries is $0.70 per
dollar spent on the program, slightly less than the $0.72 transfer to employers. The cost
to ineligible low-skill workers is a substantial $0.43. The net transfer to workers is only
$0.28.
Row 4 presents changes in after-tax income, adding to the transfers changes in earnings
resulting from changes in labor supply. Earnings changes magnify the pure transfers.
After-tax income of women with children rises by $1.21 for every dollar spent on the
program, but that of childless women falls by $0.73, and the net increase in workers’
after-tax income is less than half of the amount spent on the credit.
Given the possible confounding of EITC-induced wage e￿ects with other sources of
changes in relative demand for low-skill labor, the elasticities used for this calculation
may be incorrect. I argued above that the likely bias was toward overstatement of jj,
which would imply that employers capture an even larger share of the credit. If demand
is more elastic than I have estimated, however, the employer share is smaller than 72%,
but likely remains substantial. For example, if the true demand elasticity is -1.5 ￿ outside
of the [0; 1] range that Hamermesh (1993) claims is plausible ￿ the employer share is only
33%. This continues to be borne to a large extent by uncovered workers, however. The
net transfer from women without children is $0.20 per dollar of EITC spending, while
that to women with children is $0.87.
The calculations discussed here focus on the ￿ow of dollars rather than on welfare.
They also ignore the taxes that would be needed to ￿nance an EITC or other transfer.
Finally, they ignore preexisting distortions to the low-skill labor market. Since many single
would be quite wide. The EITC’s transfer to employers would disappear, however, only if labor supply
were perfectly inelastic or demand perfectly elastic. If, as the results here indicate, the elasticity of supply
is large relative to that of demand, the transfer from low-wage workers to their employers is substantial.
31mothers face positive net e￿ective tax rates that more than o￿set the EITC’s negative
rate, EITC expansions produce ￿rst-order reductions in deadweight loss. Nevertheless,
the EITC is seen by policymakers more as an income transfer program than as a correction
for labor market distortions. It transfers much less money to low-skill workers than the
statutory distribution would indicate. With my elasticity estimates, the net transfer to
single mothers amounts to only about two thirds of what is intended, and that to single
workers as a whole is less than one third of the amount spent on the program. Even if the
policymaker attaches zero value to single mothers’ leisure, and so cares only about total
after-tax incomes, the EITC transfers less than half as much per dollar spent as would a
targeted lump-sum transfer. 47 Although perfect targeting might be infeasible, a parallel
simulation of a similarly-sized NIT that phases out linearly with income￿which would be
at least as easy to administer as the EITC￿indicates that it would have minimal e￿ects
on labor supply and earnings, and would therefore be approximately as cost e￿ective as
the infeasible transfer. The wage e￿ects of the EITC make it less attractive relative to
other income support mechanisms than it ￿rst appears.
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Hourly Wage, 1992/3 Schedule ($1992)
Source:  Author's analysis of 1992/3 and 1995-7 CPS March and ORG.  "Naive" series assumes real wages 
did not change.  "Actual" series incorporates changes in wage schedules, and shows estimated change in 
mean MTR for women in the skill group that earned wage w in 1992/3.  "Simulated" series is predicted change 
in mean taxes from pre-period data, holding labor supply constant and assuming real wages grow 1% per year.
Figure 2.
Change in mean MTR among families with working women,
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Hourly Wage, 1992/3 Schedule ($1992)
Source:  Author's analysis of 1992/3 and 1995-7 CPS March and ORG.  "Naive" series assumes real wages 
did not change.  "Actual" series incorporates changes in wage schedules, and shows estimated change in 
mean ATR for women in the skill group that earned wage w in 1992/3.  "Simulated" series is predicted change 
in mean taxes from pre-period data, holding labor supply constant and assuming real wages grow 1% per year.
Figure 3.
Change in mean ATR among families with working women,
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Hourly Wage, 1992/3 Schedule ($1992)
Source:  Author's analysis of 1992/3 and 1995-7 CPS ORG.  90% confidence intervals, indicated by shaded
regions, are computed by sampling the underlying microdata (with replacement) and feeding bootstrap samples
through the DFL algorithm; see text for details.
Figure 4.
Change in labor force participation,
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Hourly Wage, 1992/3 Schedule ($1992)
Source:  Author's analysis of 1992/3 and 1995-7 CPS ORG.  90% confidence intervals, indicated by shaded
regions, are computed by sampling the underlying microdata (with replacement) and feeding bootstrap samples
through the DFL algorithm; see text for details.
Figure 5.
Change in employment rate (of those in LF),
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Hourly Wage, 1992/3 Schedule ($1992)
Source:  Author's analysis of 1992/3 and 1995-7 CPS ORG.  90% confidence intervals, indicated by shaded
regions, are computed by sampling the underlying microdata (with replacement) and feeding bootstrap samples
through the DFL algorithm; see text for details.
Figure 6.
Change in usual hours if employed,
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Hourly Wage, 1992/3 Schedule ($1992)
Source:  Author's analysis of 1992/3 and 1995-7 CPS ORG.  90% confidence intervals, indicated by shaded
regions, are computed by sampling the underlying microdata (with replacement) and feeding bootstrap samples
through the DFL algorithm; see text for details.
Figure 7.
Change in total weekly hours per person,
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Hourly Wage, 1992/3 Schedule ($1992)
Source:  Author's analysis of 1992/3 and 1995-7 CPS ORG.  90% confidence intervals, indicated by shaded
regions, are computed by sampling the underlying microdata (with replacement) and feeding the bootstrap 
samples through the DFL algorithm; see text for details.  Dashed lines show naive point estimates (but 
not C.I.s) of the difference between corresponding percentiles of the raw log wage distributions, ignoring 
changes in composition.
Figure 8.
Change in log wages, women, by skill and group
 Table 1.  Summary statistics before and after the EITC expansion
Pre Post Change Pre Change Pre Change Pre Change Pre Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Population
N (unweighted) 166,715 143,504 -23,211 118,891 -17,717 30,005 -3,234 8,444 -978 9,375 -1,282
Share of pop. 100% 100% 71% -0.8% 18% 0.7% 5% 0.1% 6% 0.0%
Black 0.12 0.12 0.002 0.07 0.001 0.17 0.008 0.30 -0.002 0.37 -0.015
(0.32) (0.33) [0.001] (0.25) [0.001] (0.38) [0.004] (0.46) [0.008] (0.48) [0.008]
Hispanic 0.09 0.09 0.007 0.08 0.007 0.07 0.003 0.10 0.020 0.16 0.009
(0.28) (0.29) [0.001] (0.28) [0.001] (0.25) [0.002] (0.30) [0.006] (0.36) [0.006]
Age 40.8 41.2 0.45 41.0 0.50 43.7 0.22 36.0 0.24 33.4 0.54
(11.6) (11.4) [0.05] (11.3) [0.05] (13.0) [0.12] (9.2) [0.17] (7.0) [0.12]
Education 12.8 13.0 0.19 12.9 0.19 13.0 0.18 12.4 0.17 11.9 0.23
(2.6) (2.6) [0.01] (1.5) [0.01] (2.8) [0.03] (2.3) [0.04] (2.4) [0.04]
Employed 0.61 0.69 0.073 0.59 0.081 0.72 0.031 0.66 0.073 0.50 0.103
(0.49) (0.46) [0.002] (0.49) [0.002] (0.45) [0.004] (0.47) [0.008] (0.50) [0.008]
21.3 23.6 2.32 19.8 2.53 27.1 1.02 24.2 2.34 18.0 3.12
(19.9) (19.6) [0.08] (19.6) [0.09] (19.7) [0.18] (19.5) [0.34] (19.7) [0.33]
Workforce (Hours weighted)
Share of workforce 100% 100% 66% -0.1% 23% -0.7% 6% 0.2% 5% 0.4%
Black 0.12 0.11 -0.001 0.08 -0.003 0.14 0.002 0.27 -0.012 0.30 -0.006
(0.32) (0.32) [0.002] (0.27) [0.002] (0.35) [0.005] (0.44) [0.011] (0.46) [0.012]
Hispanic 0.07 0.08 0.008 0.07 0.007 0.05 0.004 0.09 0.021 0.12 0.010
(0.26) (0.27) [0.002] (0.26) [0.002] (0.23) [0.003] (0.28) [0.008] (0.33) [0.009]
Age 39.2 39.6 0.46 39.2 0.57 40.7 0.55 36.5 -0.02 34.9 -0.17
(10.4) (10.4) [0.06] (10.1) [0.07] (12.1) [0.16] (8.2) [0.21] (6.3) [0.17]
Education 13.3 13.5 0.17 13.3 0.19 13.7 0.15 12.9 0.20 12.6 0.09
(2.4) (2.4) [0.01] (2.3) [0.02] (2.5) [0.03] (2.1) [0.05] (2.4) [0.06]
log(wage) 2.23 2.25 0.020 2.23 0.028 2.30 0.017 2.14 0.012 2.08 -0.025
(0.51) (0.52) [0.003] (0.50) [0.004] (0.53) [0.007] (0.51) [0.013] (0.50) [0.013]
Single
Notes:  Standard deviations in parentheses; heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for changes in square brackets.  Bold 
changes are significant at the 5% level.
Zero children One child Two+ children
Hours / week (0 if 
not employed)
All women MarriedDependent variable: In labor 
force





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS
-0.029 -0.015 0.230 -0.385 0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.388) (0.444) (0.015)
-0.037 -0.028 -0.187 -0.885 -0.036





N 310,219 310,219 202,282 310,219 148,209
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses; bold coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level.  All models include controls for a rich vector of observable characteristics (see page 19); main effects for 
single, for 1 and 2 or more children, for post-1994, and for a standardized predicted skill index (computed as 
the fitted value from a pre-1994 regression of log wages on observable characteristics using only employed 
women); and all two- and three-way interactions of the marital status, children, time, and wage index variables.  
Probit columns report marginal effects.  Sample derives from the 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1997 CPS 






Table 2.  Simple regression estimates of the change in low-wage single mothers' labor supply and 
wages
Single*post-1994*skill indexTable 3.  Estimates of tax effects on labor supply, measured as weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A:  All women
Model 1
Change in ATR -0.57 -0.56 -0.57 -0.65 -0.63 -0.62
(0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
(Married) x (# of kids) dummies y y y y y y
Base log wage n y n n y n
Skill group fixed effects n n y n n y
Model 2
Change in MTR -0.27 -0.30 -0.31 -0.13 -0.21 -0.22
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Model 3
Change in ATR -0.56 -0.53 -0.54 -0.65 -0.60 -0.58
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24)
Change in MTR -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.06 -0.08
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19)
Panel B:  Single women
Model 1
Change in ATR -0.61 -0.72 -0.72 -0.64 -0.77 -0.73
(0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.24) (0.25)
Model 2
Change in MTR -0.25 -0.25 -0.24 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18)
Model 3
Change in ATR -0.62 -0.79 -0.79 -0.65 -0.85 -0.80
(0.21) (0.26) (0.26) (0.23) (0.28) (0.29)
Change in MTR 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.11
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19)
OLS IV
Notes:  Dependent variable is the percentage change in labor supply (weekly hours) per woman.  Observations are 
187 skill by six (Panel A) or three (Panel B) demographic groups, yielding N=1,122 or 561.  Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are estimated as 0.74 times the interquartile range of 600 bootstrap replications, each sampling from 
the underlying CPS data and re-estimating the DFL model and then the labor supply regressions.  Bold 
coefficients exceed 1.96 standard errors (in absolute value).  IV estimates instrument for the actual change in 
mean tax rates with that predicted by applying the post-period tax schedule to pre-period observations.Table 4.  IV estimates of reduced-form tax effects on labor supply at various margins
ATR MTR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sequential breakdown of labor supply
(1) Population size 0.33 0.20 0.23 0.16
(0.24) (0.15) (0.28) (0.18)
(2) Labor force participation -1.13 -0.11 -1.21 0.11
(0.20) (0.14) (0.23) (0.15)
(3) Employment conditional on LFP 0.35 0.02 0.38 -0.05
(0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06)
(4) Formal sector (not SE) conditional on employment -0.04 0.04 -0.08 0.06
(0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06)
(5) Hours conditional on non-SE employment -0.09 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03
(0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05)
(6) Non-allocation of wages conditional on hours -0.12 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02
(0.11) (0.08) (0.14) (0.09)
Interesting combinations
(7) Employment-population ratio (=2+3) -0.60 -0.04 -0.66 0.09
(0.21) (0.15) (0.24) (0.16)
(8) Total hours per person (=2+3+4+5) -0.73 -0.04 -0.80 0.11
(0.25) (0.18) (0.29) (0.19)
(9) Total hours worked (=1+2+3+4+5) -0.36 0.20 -0.56 0.30
(0.38) (0.26) (0.45) (0.29)
March CPS data
(10) Annual labor force participation -0.55 0.17 -0.75 0.31
(0.23) (0.14) (0.26) (0.16)
(11) Annual hours worked if ever in labor force -0.32 0.10 -0.44 0.18
(0.20) (0.18) (0.24) (0.21)
Wages
(12) Hourly wages -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.15) (0.11) (0.21) (0.13)
Both together
Notes:  Specifications are identical to those in Panel B, Column 6 of Table 3, but the dependent variable varies 
across rows.  All are measured as percentage changes, so coefficients are interpretable as the negative of 
elasticities with respect to marginal/average wages.  Standard errors are in parentheses; bold coefficients exceed 
1.96 standard errors (in absolute value).
ATR only MTR 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable:  Change in labor supply, group g, skill s
-σ -0.73 -0.74 -1.06 -1.06
(0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23)
-0.24 -1.02 0.00 -0.26
(0.32) (1.26) (1.02) (2.02)
-0.10 -0.16 -0.20 -0.12
(0.21) (0.37) (0.31) (0.63)
Group dummies y y y y
Base log wage y y n n
Skill dummies n n y y
1992-1996 indicator n n y y
Base log wage * 1992-1996 n n y y
Dependent variable:  Change in wage, group g, skill s
-1.26 -5.14 2.45 4.78
(0.39) (1.75) (1.33) (2.28)
-0.38 -0.52 -0.22 -1.14
(0.29) (0.63) (0.26) (0.70)
1992-1996 changes 1988-1992 & 1992-1996 
changes
Notes:  All specifications use labor supply and wage observations for single women with zero, one, and two or 
more children.  All are estimated by IV, using the pre-reform prediction of the change in tax rates as an 
instrument for the observed change.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated as 0.74 times the interquartile 
range of 600 bootstrap replications, each sampling from the underlying CPS data and re-estimating the DFL 
model.   Bold coefficients exceed 1.96 standard errors (in absolute value).
Change in population size (avg. across 
groups)
Change in avg. ATR (across groups)
Change in avg. ATR (across groups)
Change in ATR within group















−Table 6.  Inverse labor demand
Dependent variable is the change in log wages at skill s in demographic goup g
Wage measures
Sample







Group dummies y y nn nn
Base log wage y y y y nn
Skill dummies n n n n y y
1992-1996 indicator n n n n y y
Base log wage * 1992-1996 n n n n y y
0.83 0.20 0.96 0.30 -0.28 -0.37
(0.37) (0.12) (0.48) (0.19) (0.14) (0.21)
1988-1992 & 1992-1996
All single women Single, childless women
Change in hours per person, avg. 
among single women
Change in hours per person, avg. 
among all women
Additional controls
Implied elasticity of demand
Notes:  Changes in hours are treated as endogenous; instruments are the pre-reform prediction of the mean change in 
ATRs in the relevant group.  All models include controls for the change in the population size of the groups over 
which labor supply and wage changes are measured.  Standard errors are estimated as 0.74 times the interquartile range 
of 600 bootstrap replications, each sampling from the underlying CPS data and re-estimating the DFL model.  Bold 
coefficients exceed 1.96 standard errors (in absolute value).  Elasticities are computed from the coefficient on the 
average change in labor supply among single/all women, and their standard errors via the delta method.
1992-1996 1992-1996
Change in hours per person within 
demographic groupTable 7.  Alternate specificatons for elasticity parameters












(2) Using only every 2nd percentile (47 skill groups)
(3) Using only every 3.5th percentile (27 skill groups)
(1) Base specifications
(4) Pre-TANF sample
Notes:  "Base specification" in column 1, row 1 is that used in Model 1 of Table 3, Column 6, Panel B. Base 
specification in column 2 is that used in Table 6, column 5.  Remaining rows use fewer skill groups (rows 2 and 3) 
or use labor supply and wage changes estimated from a CPS sample that excludes observations potentially 
affected by welfare reform (row 4).  Standard errors in parentheses; bold coefficients exceed 1.96 standard 
deviations (in absolute value).
ρ σ
σ
−Table 8.  Incidence of $1 in transfers to single mothers via the EITC
Eligible Ineligible Total
(with children) (no children)
(1) (2) (3)
(1) Tax credits + 1.00 -- + 1.00
(2) Labor market effects
(2A) Change in labor supply + 0.51 - 0.31 + 0.20
(2B) Change in wages (at old labor supply) - 0.30 - 0.43 - 0.72
(2C) Residual (interaction) - 0.01 + 0.01 - 0.00
(2D) Change in earnings (=2A + 2B + 2C) + 0.21 - 0.73 - 0.53
(3) Total transfer (=1 + 2B) + 0.70 - 0.43 + 0.28
(4) Total change in after-tax income (=1+2D) + 1.21 - 0.73 + 0.47
Notes:  I simulate a credit expansion for single mothers with total payments equal to $1.  Simulation is based on 
σ=0.73, ρ=-0.28, a distinct labor market for single women, and the observed distribution of single women with and 
without children across skill levels.  Appendix Table 1.  EITC parameters, 1987-2001 (in constant 1992 dollars)
Kink 1 Kink 2 Kink 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
One-child families
1983 -10.0% 12.5% $704 $7,043 $8,452 $14,086 $3.52 $4.23 $7.04 $4.72
1984 -10.0% 12.5% $675 $6,752 $8,102 $13,503 $3.38 $4.05 $6.75 $4.52
1985 -14.0% 12.2% $717 $6,520 $8,475 $14,343 $3.26 $4.24 $7.17 $4.37
1986 -14.0% 12.2% $704 $6,401 $8,321 $14,081 $3.20 $4.16 $7.04 $4.29
1987 -14.0% 10.0% $1,051 $7,509 $8,546 $19,059 $3.75 $4.27 $9.53 $4.14
1988 -14.0% 10.0% $1,037 $7,400 $11,670 $22,031 $3.70 $5.83 $11.02 $3.97
1989 -14.0% 10.0% $1,030 $7,354 $11,586 $21,882 $3.68 $5.79 $10.94 $3.79
1990 -14.0% 10.0% $1,023 $7,310 $11,518 $21,752 $3.66 $5.76 $10.88 $4.08
1991 -16.7% 11.9% $1,228 $7,355 $11,589 $21,890 $3.68 $5.79 $10.94 $4.38
1992 -17.6% 12.6% $1,324 $7,520 $11,840 $22,370 $3.76 $5.92 $11.19 $4.25
1993 -18.5% 13.2% $1,392 $7,525 $11,845 $22,380 $3.76 $5.92 $11.19 $4.13
1994 -26.3% 16.0% $1,929 $7,337 $10,414 $22,489 $3.67 $5.21 $11.24 $4.02
1995 -34.0% 16.0% $1,928 $5,671 $10,394 $22,459 $2.84 $5.20 $11.23 $3.91
1996 -34.0% 16.0% $1,924 $5,660 $10,382 $22,425 $2.83 $5.19 $11.21 $4.25
1997 -34.0% 16.0% $1,932 $5,682 $10,429 $22,509 $2.84 $5.21 $11.25 $4.50
1998 -34.0% 16.0% $1,955 $5,750 $10,553 $22,786 $2.87 $5.28 $11.39 $4.43
1999 -34.0% 16.0% $1,947 $5,727 $10,493 $22,677 $2.86 $5.25 $11.34 $4.34
2000 -34.0% 16.0% $1,917 $5,638 $10,339 $22,335 $2.82 $5.17 $11.17 $4.20
2001 -34.0% 16.0% $1,923 $5,656 $10,370 $22,404 $2.83 $5.19 $11.20 $4.08
1991 -17.3% 12.4% $1,272 $7,355 $11,589 $21,890 $3.68 $5.79 $10.94 $4.38
1992 -18.4% 13.1% $1,384 $7,520 $11,840 $22,370 $3.76 $5.92 $11.19 $4.25
1993 -19.5% 13.9% $1,467 $7,525 $11,845 $22,380 $3.76 $5.92 $11.19 $4.13
1994 -30.0% 17.7% $2,393 $7,976 $10,414 $23,948 $3.99 $5.21 $11.97 $4.02
1995 -36.0% 20.2% $2,863 $7,954 $10,394 $24,555 $3.98 $5.20 $12.28 $3.91
1996 -40.0% 21.1% $3,180 $7,949 $10,382 $25,480 $3.97 $5.19 $12.74 $4.25
1997 -40.0% 21.1% $3,196 $7,990 $10,429 $25,604 $3.99 $5.21 $12.80 $4.50
1998 -40.0% 21.1% $3,233 $8,082 $10,553 $25,904 $4.04 $5.28 $12.95 $4.43
1999 -40.0% 21.1% $3,214 $8,034 $10,493 $25,753 $4.02 $5.25 $12.88 $4.34
2000 -40.0% 21.1% $3,168 $7,919 $10,339 $25,381 $3.96 $5.17 $12.69 $4.20
2001 -40.0% 21.1% $3,175 $7,938 $10,370 $25,454 $3.97 $5.19 $12.73 $4.08
Families without children
1983-1993:  No credit
1994 -7.7% 7.7% $290 $3,787 $4,733 $8,520 $1.89 $2.37 $4.26 $4.02
1995 -7.7% 7.7% $289 $3,774 $4,723 $8,497 $1.89 $2.36 $4.25 $3.91
1996 -7.7% 7.7% $289 $3,774 $4,721 $8,495 $1.89 $2.36 $4.25 $4.25
1997 -7.7% 7.7% $290 $3,794 $4,747 $8,540 $1.90 $2.37 $4.27 $4.50
1998 -7.7% 7.7% $294 $3,839 $4,794 $8,633 $1.92 $2.40 $4.32 $4.43
1999 -7.7% 7.7% $292 $3,815 $4,775 $8,590 $1.91 $2.39 $4.29 $4.34
2000 -7.7% 7.7% $288 $3,756 $4,701 $8,457 $1.88 $2.35 $4.23 $4.20
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Two or more children
1983-1990:  Same as one child
Year Phase-
in
Phase-
out
1) Phase-in 
to plateau